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Background: Efficient effort expenditure to obtain rewards is critical for optimal goal-directed behavior and
learning. Clinical observation suggests that individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) may show
dysregulated reward-based effort expenditure, but no behavioral study to date has assessed effort-based
decision-making in ASD.
Methods: The current study compared a group of adults with ASD to a group of typically developing adults on the
Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task (EEfRT), a behavioral measure of effort-based decision-making. In this task,
participants were provided with the probability of receiving a monetary reward on a particular trial and asked to
choose between either an “easy task” (less motoric effort) for a small, stable reward or a “hard task” (greater motoric
effort) for a variable but consistently larger reward.
Results: Participants with ASD chose the hard task more frequently than did the control group, yet were less
influenced by differences in reward value and probability than the control group. Additionally, effort-based
decision-making was related to repetitive behavior symptoms across both groups.
Conclusions: These results suggest that individuals with ASD may be more willing to expend effort to obtain a
monetary reward regardless of the reward contingencies. More broadly, results suggest that behavioral choices may
be less influenced by information about reward contingencies in individuals with ASD. This atypical pattern of
effort-based decision-making may be relevant for understanding the heightened reward motivation for
circumscribed interests in ASD.
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Clinical observations suggest that individuals with autism
spectrum disorders (ASDs) may have reduced motivation
to seek social interaction, yet heightened motivation to
expend effort in the pursuit of certain non-social stimuli
(that is, circumscribed interests). Consistent with these
observations, some theoretical and clinical conceptualiza-
tions of ASD highlight a failure to assign reward value to
social interactions originating in infancy (example, [1-3]).
According to such models, early decreased social reward
motivation may lead to deficits in basic social and
language abilities [4].* Correspondence: cdamiano@email.unc.edu
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orThe high prevalence of circumscribed interests in this
population further suggests that ASD is characterized
by not only diminished motivation for social stimuli but
also atypical motivation for idiosyncratic non-social
stimuli as well [5-7]. More generally, reward processing
atypicalities for both social and non-social stimuli
have been evidenced in ASD through behavioral, psycho-
physiological, and neuroimaging studies in this popula-
tion [8-16].
Although several different approaches have been used to
measure the functional output of reward processing
systems in ASD, reward-based choices in the context of
effort expenditure have yet to be examined in this
population. Effort-based decision-making indexes the
behavioral motivation to obtain rewards relative to effortal Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
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iginal work is properly cited.
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rewards (that is, reward-based cost-benefit decisions). This
process is critically important for choosing among
biologically relevant goal-directed behaviors, such as feed-
ing, learning, and social interactions [17-19]. Preclinical
data indicate that effort-based decision-making is one sub-
component of reward processing that is mediated in part
by the mesolimbic dopamine system [20,21]. More specif-
ically, animal studies suggest that dopaminergic activity in
the ventral striatum (and more specifically the nucleus
accumbens (NAc)) mediates how expected reward
value and effort expenditure influence behavioral choices
[22-24]. Depletion or reduction of dopaminergic activity in
the NAc diminishes the tendency to expend effort to
obtain a reward [25,26]. In other words, NAc dopamine
appears to influence the tendency to choose behaviors that
offer greater reward requiring greater effort expenditure
[27]. In this regard, ventral striatal dopamine depletions
appear to shift the cost-benefit gradient that governs
effort-based decision-making such that an animal with
intact dopaminergic functioning expends greater amounts
of effort for larger rewards whereas animals with ventral
striatal dopamine depletion choose lower-effort, smaller-
reward options. Importantly, alterations in reward proces-
sing within ventral striatal regions have been reported
in ASD [9,10,16].
Despite accumulating evidence suggesting reward
processing atypicalities in ASD, no research to date has
investigated decisions related to effort-based reward
motivation in ASD. Previous research has demonstrated
impaired decision-making in individuals with ASD
[11,28,29], yet no study to date has examined decision-
making in the context of varying degrees of reward magni-
tude, reward probability, and effort expenditure to obtain
rewards. The goal of the present study was to investigate
choices in the context of varying rewards and behavioral
effort expenditure in ASD via an effort-based decision-
making task, the Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task
(EEfRT). The EEfRT requires participants to choose
between an “easy task” or a “hard task” under varying
reward probabilities to earn different amounts of monetary
rewards. The EEfRT was originally developed to mimic
seminal animal studies demonstrating the role of mesolim-
bic dopaminergic functioning in effort-based decision-
making [30], and human studies supporting the sensitivity
of this task to the functional output of mesolimbic
dopamine systems. Specifically, there is evidence that
EEfRT performance is related to individual differences in
symptoms of anhedonia (that is, decreased sensitivity
to rewards; [31]) and is modulated by administration by
d-amphetamine, a dopamine agonist [32]. The EEfRT
measures the capacity to make efficient decisions by
dynamically responding to changing information about
reward probability and magnitude.Based upon empirical evidence of reward processing
impairments in dopaminergic projection regions involved
in effort-based decision-making [8-12,15,16] as well as
evidence for impaired decision-making in ASD [11,28,29],
we hypothesized that individuals with ASD would demon-
strate atypical decision-making related to effort expend-
iture for rewards that would be characterized by decreased
sensitivity to reward probabilities and effort contingencies,
relative to neurotypical control participants. Because
individuals with ASD may be relatively more willing to
expend effort for some non-social stimuli [6,33,34], we
further hypothesized that effort-based decision-making
profiles would be related to circumscribed interests in
ASD, as circumscribed interests have been linked to
reward system functioning in previous studies [9,35].
Methods
Participants
Participants included 20 adults with ASD (male/female:
17/3; age: M= 25.95, SD= 7.96, range = 18 to 48) and 38
typically developing controls (male/female: 34/4; age:
M= 20.42, SD= 5.64, range = 18 to 43). Exclusion criteria
for both groups included known motor or sensory deficits
and an intelligence quotient (IQ) score≤ 85 (Wechsler
Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence) [36]. Participants with
ASD were recruited from the Autism Subject Registry
maintained through the University of North Carolina
(UNC) Carolina Institute for Developmental Disabilities.
Twelve participants were diagnosed with high-functioning
autism and eight participants were diagnosed with
Asperger’s syndrome. All ASD diagnoses were made
according to expert clinical judgment of licensed clinical
psychologists experienced in ASD diagnoses and con-
firmed by standard algorithm cutoff scores for a diagnosis
of Autism Spectrum Disorder on Module 4 of the Autism
Diagnostic Observation Schedule-Generic (ADOS-G) [37].
Control participants were recruited via the Human Partici-
pation in Research Subject Pool maintained by the UNC
Department of Psychology and from a database of control
participants maintained by our laboratory. The Autism-
Spectrum Queotient (AQ) [38] was used to screen
controls for high levels of autism symptomatology, and
all control participants scored below the recommended
cutoff for ASD on the AQ (≤ 32; M= 14.05, SD=6.19,
range= 3 to 29).
Groups did not differ in Verbal IQ, Performance
IQ, Full Scale IQ, handedness (as measured by the
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory [39] or gender ratios,
all p’s> .10 (see Table 1). However, ASD participants
were significantly older than control participants (ASD:
M= 25.95, SD= 7.96; Control: M= 20.42, SD= 5.64),
Welch’s t(29.31) = 2.76, p= 0.01. When age was entered
into analyses as a covariate, there were no significant
main effects or interactions involving age on any
Table 1 Means (and Standard Deviations) scores on demographic and clinical measures for the ASD and Control
Groups
ASD (n = 20) Control (n = 38) t / χ2 p
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Age 25.95 (7.96) 20.42 (5.64) 2.764 0.01
Verbal IQ 112.50 (14.65) 112.94 (9.94) -0.135 0.89
Performance IQ 113.60 (10.39) 109.17 (9.06) 1.664 0.10
Full Scale IQ 114.70 (11.25) 112.82 (8.66) 0.709 0.48
Handedness (Absolute Value) a 68.55 (24.48) 74.72 (21.00) -1.004 0.32
Right: Left: Ambidextrous 16:1:3 31:2:5 0.038 0.98
Male: Female ratio 17:3 34:4 0.247 0.62
IRB Insistence on Sameness 5.61 (3.85) 1.74 (1.70) 4.082 <0.01
Range 0-14 0-5
IRB Circumscribed Interests 8.17 (2.88) 2.18 (2.05) 8.927 <0.01
Range 4 to 13 0 to 9
IRB Motor Stereotypies 6.06 (3.64) 2.66 (2.39) 3.612 <0.01
Range 0 to 11 0 to 8
ADOS SBRI 1.68 (1.62) N/A N/A N/A
Range 0 to 5
ADOS Communication 3.95 (1.36) N/A N/A N/A
Range 2 to 7
ADOS Social Interaction 8.35(2.70) N/A N/A N/A
Range 4 to 14
aHandedness was indexed with the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory [39]. For each participant, this questionnaire provided handedness as both a continuous
value (from −40 to 40, with larger negative values indicating a stronger preference for the left hand and larger positive values indicating a stronger right hand
preference) and a categorical value (left-handed: <−40, ambidextrous: ≤-40 and ≤+40, and right-handed: >+40). The absolute value of handedness is an index of
the degree of ambidexterity regardless of right or left hand preference (with values closer to 0 indicating greater ambidexterity). The ADOS was only completed
with the ASD group. ADOS, Autism Diagnostic Interview. IRB = Interview for Repetitive Behaviors. SBRI, Stereotyped Behaviors and Restricted Interests.
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diagnostic group as a factor (see the Additional file 1:
Supplementary Materials). Thus, age was not included as
a covariate in the analyses reported below.
Measures
Effort-expenditure for rewards task (‘EEfRT’)
The EEfRT measures the willingness to expend effort to
obtain a monetary reward under different conditions of
reward probability and reward magnitude [31]. All parti-
cipants completed 50 trials. In each trial, participants
were asked to choose between an ‘easy task’ and a ‘hard
task’ (Figure 1). It was emphasized that successful trial
completion did not guarantee winning money (a ‘win
trial’) but rather it was possible that successful comple-
tion could result in not wining money (a ‘no win’ trial).
Before making this choice, participants were provided
with two pieces of information that varied from trial to
trial: 1) reward probability (12%, 50%, or 88%) of a ‘win’
or ‘no win’ trial upon successful trial completion, and 2)
reward magnitude for successfully completed ‘win’ trials.
Reward magnitudes were $1.00 for successful completion
of easy task ‘win’ trials and one of 17 levels of rewardmagnitude ranging from $1.24 to $4.12 for successful
hard task ‘win’ trials. Trials were presented in the same
randomized order for every participant.
Successful completion of the easy task required 30
repeated button presses in seven seconds on a standard
keyboard using the dominant index finger, while success-
ful completion of the hard task required 100 presses with
the non-dominant ‘pinky’ finger in 21 seconds. With
each press a line was added to a rectangle onscreen and
participants were informed that they would be eligible
to win money for each trial if they raised this bar to the
top of the rectangle. The time remaining was also
displayed throughout the trial. Following the task,
participants were informed whether they completed the
task successfully and, if they had completed it success-
fully, how much money they won. They were also
informed that the summed value of two randomly-
selected win trials would be given as a bonus ($2.00 to
$8.24) in addition to the base rate compensation ($10).
The EEfRT was modified so that participants had an
unlimited amount of time to make choices to accom-
modate potential slower processing speeds in the ASD
group [40,41].
Figure 1 Schematic diagram of the Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task (‘EEfRT’). A) Participants were presented with information regarding
the reward magnitude of the hard task for that trial, and the probability of receiving any reward for both the easy and hard tasks. B) Participants
chose the easy or hard task by pressing a designated key. C) Participants made rapid button presses to complete the chosen task for seven
seconds (easy task) or 21 seconds (hard task). D) Participants received feedback on whether they have completed the task. E) Participants received
reward feedback indicating whether they received any money for that trial.
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The ADOS is a standardized assessment for observing
behavior relevant to autism symptomatology. The standard
algorithm cutoff scores from Module 4 of this measure were
used to inform diagnostic evaluations or confirmations.
Interview for Repetitive Behavior (IRB)
The IRB [42] is a semi-structured clinical interview designed
to measure the occurrence of a variety of types of repetitive
behaviors and interests and their severity in individuals with
ASD. Trained interviewers rated the frequency, intensity,
interference, and accommodation needed for each of these
behaviors and interests based upon participants’ descrip-
tions. Scores were derived for motor stereotypies, insistence
on sameness, and circumscribed interests with higher scores
indicating greater severity and functional impairment. These
scores were then used in hierarchical regression analyses
examining the relationship between EEfRT performance
and repetitive behavior measures.
Data analysis strategy
Primary analyses investigated whether the ASD group
differed from the control group in the willingness to
expend effort to obtain uncertain rewards via a 3 (Reward
Magnitude: small, medium, large) x 3 (Probability: 12%,
50%, 88%) x 2 (Group: ASD, control) repeated measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA). Levels of the Reward
Magnitude factor were grouped in the following manner:
small was defined as any value between $1.24 and $2.00,
medium as values between $2.01 and $3.00, and large as
values between $3.00 and $4.12. The dependent variable(that is, the willingness to expend effort for rewards) was
the percentage of times the hard task was chosen across
all trials of the EEfRT task (including all levels of Probabil-
ity and Reward Magnitude). These analyses were supple-
mented by a 2 (Reward Magnitude: small, large) x 2
(Probability: 12%, 88%) x 2 (Group: Autism, Control)
ANOVA with lower degrees of freedom. These analyses
simply excluded data from the medium Reward Magni-
tude condition (which as in the analyses described above,
was any value between $2.01 and $3.00) and from the 50%
Probability condition, in order to examine the pattern of
results when only the more extreme Reward Magnitude
and Probability levels were included. Between-group
t-tests were also conducted to examine potential group
differences in variables related to task performance but
unrelated to the effort-based decision-making construct
(that is, the average response time in choosing between
tasks and the number of successfully completed trials).
Secondary analyses examined the extent to which
individuals with ASD differed from controls in response
flexibility since several studies have found cognitive
flexibility impairments in ASD [43-45]. A 2 (Preceding
Trial Outcome: win, loss) × 2 (Group: ASD, control)
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with the
dependent variable of the percentage of times that each
participant changed his or her response on a given trial
from the response given on the preceding trial.
Finally, relations between EEfRT performance and
repetitive behaviors symptoms (motor stereotypies,
insistence on sameness, and circumscribed interests)
were evaluated by examining the relationship between
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IRB. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were
conducted in which Group was entered first followed by
repetitive behavior measures.Figure 3 The mean percentage of hard task choices by reward
magnitude for the ASD and Control groups. Significant group
differences were detected for small rewards, t(57) = 3.60, p= 0.001,
medium rewards, t(57) = 2.45, p= 0.02, and large rewards, t(57) = 2.07,
p= .04. The error bars indicate +/− 1 SEM. ASD, Autism Spectrum
Disorder; SEM, standard error of the mean.Results
Percentage of hard task choices
The omnibus 3 (Reward Magnitude: small, medium, large)
× 3 (Probability: 12%, 50%, 88%) x 2 (Group: ASD, control)
repeated measures ANOVA performed on the percentage
of hard task choices revealed a significant three-way
interaction, F(4, 53) = 4.12, p=0.006, and a significant
Probability x Group interaction, F(2, 55) = 44.81, p=0.003.
However, the Reward Magnitude x Group interaction was
not significant, F(2, 55) = 1.73, p= .19. Significant main
effects were detected for Probability, F(2, 55) = 44.81,
p< 0.001, Reward Magnitude, F(2, 55) = 69.16, p< 0.001,
and Group, F(1, 56) = 10.64, p=0.002. The main effect of
Group reflects a greater percentage of hard task choices
overall in the ASD (M= 64.08, SD=24.53) versus the
control (M= 45.57, SD=20.39) group. This finding
suggests that individuals with ASD demonstrated a greater
willingness to expend effort for rewards across all trial
types compared to controls. Between-groups t-tests also
revealed a significantly greater proportion of hard task
choices in the ASD group versus the control group at each
probability levels and all reward value levels, all p’s< 0.05,
except at the 50% level, t(56) = 1.66, p=0.10 (see Figures 2
and 3). A 2 (Reward Magnitude: small, large) × 2 (Prob-
ability: 12%, 88%) × 2 (Group: Autism, Control) ANOVAFigure 2 The mean percentage of hard task choices by reward
probability for the ASD and Control groups. Significant group
differences were detected at the 12% probability level, t(57) = 3.31,
p= 0.003, and the 88% probability level, t(57) = 2.37, p= 0.02. The
error bars indicate +/− 1 SEM. ASD, Autism Spectrum Disorder; SEM,
standard error of the mean.(in which data from the medium Reward magnitude and
50% Probability conditions were excluded from analyses)
yielded the same pattern of results.
Next, 3 (Reward Magnitude: small, medium, large) × 2
(Group: ASD, control) repeated measures ANOVAs were
conducted separately for each level of probability on the
percentage of hard task choices. For 12% probability trials,
this interaction effect was not significant, F(2, 55) = 1.32,
p=0.27. Yet, main effects of Reward Magnitude,
F(2, 55) = 19.89, p< 0.001, and of Group were detected,
F(2, 55) = 15.41 p< 0.001. For the 50% probability trials,
the interaction was not significant, F(2, 55) = 1.53, p=0.23,
and neither was the main effect of Group, F(2, 55) = 3.90,
p=0.05, yet there was a significant main effect of Reward
Magnitude, F(2, 55) = 44.30, p< 0.001. For 88% probability
trials, there were a significant Reward Magnitude x Group
interaction, F(2, 55) = 8.08, p=0.001, and significant main
effects of Reward Magnitude, F(2, 55) = 51.12, p< 0.001,
and of Group, F(2, 55) = 6.32, p=0.015. These results
indicate that reward magnitude significantly influenced
effort-based decision-making at all levels of probability
across both groups while group differences in decision-
making only emerged at the 12% and 88% probability
levels. In addition, at the 88% probability level, reward
magnitude had a different influence in the ASD versus
control groups: in this condition the ASD group was
more likely to choose the hard task for a small reward,
t(56) =−4.03, p< 0.001 (ASD: M = 67.00, SD = 33.26;
Control: M = 32.63, SD = 29.56), while no group
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In other words, responses of individuals in the control
group were moderated by both magnitude and prob-
ability (demonstrated by this group’s tendency to
choose the easy task more often when reward magni-
tude was small even if probability was large), while
individuals with ASD chose the hard task even in the
context of a small reward.
Next, 3 (Reward Magnitude: small, medium, and large)
× 3 (Probability: 12%, 50%, 88%) repeated measures
ANOVAs on percentage of hard task choices within each
group revealed significant main effects of Probability, F(2,
36) = 74.97, p< 0.001, and Reward Magnitude, F(2,
36) = 66.50, p< 0.001, in the control group, as well as main
effects of Probability, F(2, 18) = 9.02, p=0.002, and of Re-
ward Magnitude, F (2, 18) = 21.69, p< 0.001, in the ASD
group. The main effects of Probability and Reward Magni-
tude in both groups suggest that the percentage of hard
task choices was modulated by probability and reward
level in both the ASD and control groups. However, the
significant Reward Magnitude × Probability × Group inter-
action reported earlier indicates that diagnostic group
moderated the degree of these effects on effort-based deci-
sion-making, suggesting that the control group was more
influenced by reward parameters, such as magnitude and
probability, when compared to the ASD group.Response latency and EEfRT success
There were no group differences in average response times
for choosing between the easy and hard tasks, Welch’s t
(19.76) = 1.60, p=0.13 (ASD: M=5.96 s, SD=7.52;
Control: M=3.24 seconds, SD=1.46), or in the percentage
of trials completed successfully, Welch’s t(20.89) = 1.92,
p=0.07 (ASD: M=89.30%, SD=18.82; Control:
M=97.58%, SD=5.75). In addition, the primary dependent
variable (percentage of hard task choices) was not corre-
lated with either the average response times, r(58) = 0.60,
p=0.65, or the percentage of trials completed successfully,
r(58) =−.15, p=0.26.Response flexibility
To analyze response flexibility during effort-based decision-
making, a 2 (Preceding Trial Outcome: win, loss) x 2
(Group: ASD, control) repeated measures ANOVA wasTable 2 Means (and Standard Deviations) of the Percentage o
Preceding Trial for All Trials Overall, Trials Following a Loss, a
ASD
Mean
Overall Percent of Trials with Response Change 35.80
Percent of Trials with Response Change After Loss 37.63
Percent of Trials with Response Change After Win 41.46
ASD, Autism Spectrum Disorder.conducted to examine the dependent variable of the
percentage of trials in which participants changed their
response from the preceding trial. This analysis revealed no
significant main effects of Group, F(2, 56) = 2.51, p=0.12,
or Preceding Trial Outcome, F(2, 56) = 3.06, p=0.09,
and no significant interaction, F(2, 56) = .065, p=0.43
(see Table 2). These analyses demonstrate that individuals
with ASD did not differ significantly in response flexibility
from their typically developing counterparts (for example,
they were not simply ‘stuck’ on one task choice) and that
the ASD group was not significantly more influenced by
previous trial outcome than the control group.The relationship between EEfRT performance and
repetitive behaviors
Separate hierarchical multiple regression analyses were
conducted to examine the extent to which symptoms of
repetitive behaviors and restricted interests from the IRB
were related to the dependent variable of total percent-
age of hard task choices. Each of three separate models
included Group entered as the first predictor, then one
of the three repetitive behavior severity subscales from
the IRB (Motor Stereotypies, Insistence on Sameness,
and Circumscribed Interests) entered as a secondary
predictor and the percentage of hard task choices as the
dependent variable. As summarized in Table 3, the
models containing the subscales of Motor Stereotypies
and Insistence on Sameness did not account for a signifi-
cant amount of variance after controlling for the vari-
ance explained by Group, with Motor Stereotypies
accounting for only an additional 0.80% of the variance
and Insistence on Sameness only accounting for 0.10%.
However, in the third regression analysis, the addition of
the Circumscribed Interest predictor to the model was
significant, accounting for 7.00% of the variance in the
dependent variable (see Figure 4). These results suggest
that the tendency to have circumscribed interests is
significantly related to an increased willingness to
expend effort for rewards above and beyond the effect of
diagnostic group.
Discussion and conclusion
In the present study, we found that adults with ASD
were relatively more likely to choose to expend increasedf Trials in which the Response Changes from the
nd Trials Following a Win in the ASD and Control Groups
Control t p
(SD) Mean (SD)
(17.55) 42.11 (9.97) 1.49 0.15
(16.85) 42.70 (12.06) 1.33 0.19
(11.18) 33.82 (20.21) 1.57 0.13
Table 3 Summary from the Hierarchical Regression
Analyses Examining the Amount of Variance in EEfRT
Task Performance (the Percentage of Hard Task Choices)
Accounted for by the Repetitive Behavior Variables from
the IRB After Controlling for the Amount of Variance in
EEfRT Task Performance Accounted for by Diagnostic
Group
R2 △F p
Motor Stereotypies 0.008 0.53 0.47
Insistence on Sameness 0.001 0.76 0.74
Circumscribed Interests 0.070 5.02 0.029
EEfRT, Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task; IRB, Interview for Repetitive
Behavior.
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decreased sensitivity to reward probability and magni-
tude when making effort-based decisions. These group
differences were not attributable to other factors that
may have influenced task performance, such as task
success or response flexibility. The EEfRT was adapted
from a task designed to investigate neurobiological
mechanisms of reward motivation in animals (that is,
phasic dopamine release in the ventral striatum) [30],
and has been linked to individual differences in symp-
toms of anhedonia [31] as well as individual differences
in sensitivity to pharmacologic dopamine challenge [32].
Thus, these results suggest that individuals with ASD may
have differential cost-benefit gradients in the context
of monetary rewards with varying probabilities andFigure 4 Scatterplot of the relation between the Circumscribed Intere
mean percentage of EEfRT hard task choices. The error bars indicate +/
of the mean.magnitudes and that this atypical effort-based decision-
making pattern is potentially linked to the functional
output of dopaminergic systems. This is in contrast to
reports of diminished motivation for social rewards in
ASD [8,10,16], as our findings suggest that individuals with
ASD demonstrate atypical patterns of reward-related per-
formance in a context that is not specifically associated
with social information processing. Thus reward-related
deficits in ASD may be more general than earlier accounts
of specific deficits in social motivation have suggested.
The significant Group x Probability x Reward Magnitude
interaction effect on hard task choices suggests that the
ASD group was not simply characterized by a greater will-
ingness to expend effort for monetary rewards, but rather
was also differentially influenced by reward magnitude and
probability information in these effort-based decisions.
This is noteworthy given the extant literature on impaired
decision-making in ASD that has found that individuals
with ASD may fail to make decisions that use task infor-
mation to maximize rewards [11] and that individuals
with ASD are less likely to consider the context in
making choices about rewards or losses when compared
to a control group [28]. Similarly, in a study using a
large-scale search task in a ‘foraging room’, individuals
with ASD were found to choose a less efficient searching
strategy relative to controls, disregarding information
about rewards and not using strategies that would
minimize energy expenditure [46]. The present study
extends this line of research to suggest that ASD issts subscale of the Interview for Repetitive Behavior (IRB) and the
− 1 SEM. EEfRT, Effort Expenditure for rewards Task; SEM, standard error
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probability information when making reward-based
decisions. Our finding that adults with ASD demon-
strate inefficient effort-based decision-making charac-
terized by decreased sensitivity to reward parameters is
consistent with previous studies that have demonstrated
reward processing deficits in ASD [8-16]. Our findings
advance this growing body of literature by suggesting
that a previously unexplored aspect of reward proces-
sing, effort-based decision-making, may be atypical in
ASD as well. Whereas previous conceptualizations of
autism have focused primarily on domain-specific pro-
cessing of social information findings from this growing
body of research on reward processing and reward-
related neural circuitry in ASD also indicate impaired
processing of non-social rewards in ASD.
In line with these findings, clinical observations of
individuals with ASD also suggest atypical processing of
non-social rewards in this population, as individuals with
ASD often have circumscribed interests which appear to
involve heightened motivation to engage in nonsocial
activities in a persistent or repetitive manner [5,7,47]. In
particular, individuals with ASD seem willing to expend
effort to obtain their circumscribed interests regardless
of the context of this activity. Analyses examining the re-
lationship between performance on the EEfRT task and
the repetitive behavior symptom domain of ASD were
examined. These analyses revealed that a tendency to
choose higher-effort tasks is associated with a greater
severity of circumscribed interest symptoms as reported
on the Interview for Repetitive Behavior. This highlights
the potential relevance of effort-based decision-making
to circumscribed interests.
In line with these findings, previous neuroimaging studies
have found activation in reward processing circuitry during
the presentation of stimuli that are common circumscribed
interests in ASD [9,35]. The link between circumscribed
interests and reward processing in ASD is further
supported by clinical observations of the rewarding
nature of circumscribed interests and the successful use
of circumscribed interests as rewards in empirically
supported interventions for ASD [33,34,48]. Interest-
ingly, motivational processes are also an established part
of repetitive behavior symptomatology in obsessive-
compulsive spectrum disorders where atypical repetitive
behaviors are maintained by heightened negative valence
systems such as avoidance of anxiety [49]. In contrast,
circumscribed interests as observed in ASD appear to be
related to approach motivation. Further, our finding in
this study that individuals with ASD are more willing to
expend effort to obtain a reward may signal a bias
towards persistent approach motivated behavior in ASD
in general and not just in regard to decisions around
circumscribed interests.A limitation of this work is the inclusion of only high-
functioning individuals in the ASD group. Future
research will be needed to determine whether these
results generalize to low-functioning individuals on the
autism spectrum. Additionally, because participants in
this study were adults, future research will be needed to
address the developmental profiles of effort-based decision
making in ASD. When considered in a developmental
context, it is possible that atypical effort expenditure for
non-social rewards may be linked in some way to the early
deficits in social motivation observed in ASD. However,
because of the cross-sectional nature of this study, it is not
possible to evaluate potential causal relations between
aberrant effort-based decision-making and reduced social
motivation in ASD. Another limitation of this study is the
use of monetary rewards, given that monetary transactions
may imply a social exchange and that social status is often
ascribed to monetary gain. However, it is important to
note that monetary rewards have a significant effect on
behavioral choices and activate overlapping brain regions
as primary rewards [50,51]. Future research examining
choices to obtain rewards related to social interaction and
to circumscribed interests will be important for under-
standing the role of effort-based decision-making in ASD.
In the absence of direct measures of brain function, it
is possible that group differences in task performance were
attributable to other factors unrelated to reward proces-
sing atypicalities. In this regard, however, it is important to
consider previous findings of an association between
EEfRT performance and a diminished response to rewards
[31], as well as the influence of a dopamine agonist on
EEfRT performance [32]. The lack of group differences in
response flexibility, response latency, or the number of
successful trials suggest that group differences were due to
reward contingencies, rather than differential responding
strategies or task engagement in the ASD group.
The increased tendency for higher-effort behavioral
choices in ASD may have implications for behavioral inter-
ventions in this population. Some of the most effective
interventions for ASD have been designed to motivate
individuals with ASD to expend greater effort by manipu-
lating the consistency or saliency of rewards [52-54]. Other
successful programs have leveraged circumscribed inter-
ests to alter behavior [33,34,48]. Because children with
ASD may respond less to social rewards (such as, teacher
attention) or non-social rewards that are not salient to
them (such as, grades), reward-based interventions for
children with ASD often facilitate reward understanding in
the context of learning. Yet, even with this type of support,
there is significant heterogeneity in ASD with respect to
response to reward-based interventions [55-58] and
reward sensitivity may be an important predictor of success
in such interventions [57]. Future research on this topic
could investigate the relationship between intervention
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based decision-making.
In summary, the findings presented here provide
evidence for altered reward-based decision-making in
ASD. Task performance in the ASD group was character-
ized by a tendency to choose higher-effort tasks even in
the context of lower reward probabilities and magni-
tudes. This inefficient strategy may hinder the ability of
individuals with ASD to optimally engage or disengage
with their environment and may ultimately contribute to
the emergence or maintenance of symptoms associated
with ASD. These results add to the growing body of
literature implicating reward processing deficits in ASD
and highlight the potential role of the mesolimbic dopa-
minergic system specifically and affective processing
more generally in understanding ASD symptomatology.
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